Does anyone need 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft?
Russia's Mikoyan Design bureau has been
going through hard times during the recent years. Not that long ago, the
word "MIG" was a symbol of power of the Soviet military aviation.
Nowadays, despite its glorious history, the corporation reports losses
annually and becomes a regular recipient of government subsidies.
Perspectives on international arms
markets are not encouraging either. At the end of 2011, there were
contractual obligations to deliver 20 MiG-29 to Myanmar, 45 MiG-29K/UB
for Indian aircraft carrier program, plus an order for the modernization
of 62 MiG -29 aircraft for Indian Air Force and an order for 24
MiG-29M/M2 planes for Syrian Air Force.
The last of the above-mentioned
contracts was dropped for obvious reasons. Another order appeared,
though - 24 MiG-29K and 29K/UB for Russian deck-based aviation.
Nevertheless, with such a skinny portfolio, MiG remains far behind its
main Russian rival - Sukhoi.
In addition, competition on the export
market has been extremely high these days. The crisis pushes the
countries that either were part of the Warsaw Pact, or had agreements on
military cooperation with the Soviet Union, to sell their stockpiles of
military hardware and aviation, including used MiG-29 aircraft. Hungary
has recently announced the sale of the last batch of these.
High hopes were pinned for a new model,
but the MiG-35 - an outstanding representative of the "4 + +" class -
has not been lucky on international markets for some reason. This
aircraft has attracted widespread attention on the global air shows when
it made its debut in 2007. However, it has not received one single
serious contract. A crushing blow for the jet was the Indian MMRCA
tender. The Russian fighter did not even make into the short list,
losing to Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.
Experts and the media name various
reasons for the defeat. If we talk only about the technical side of the
issue, the majority tend to think that the Indian military declined the
Russian jet over the RD-33MK engine, which is an upgraded version of the
RD-33 from 1972. In addition, there were reports saying that India did
not like Zhuk-AE radar system, even though it is promoted as a major
highlight of the MiG-35. According to Russian designers, the radar
system guarantees the jet victory in an air battle against any "4 +"
fighter. Moreover, the radar system of MiG-35 makes it comparable to 5th
generation aircraft.
If we talk about the reasons other than
technical performance of the aircraft, then it appears that the motives
of the organizers of the tender look completely unclear. MiG-35 would
have cost less than its rivals ($10.5 billion for 126 aircraft, plus the
transfer of licenses and technology). In addition, Indian Air Force and
Navy already have about a hundred MiG-29 aircraft of various
modifications. Therefore, purchasing a fighter that is generally unified
with the 29th model would have promised extra savings.
Explaining such a strange turn of
events, MMRCA experts tend to allude to India's desire to diversify its
program of military cooperation. To put it in a nutshell, India tends to
limit the dependence of the material part of its aircraft on Russian
manufacturers, taking into consideration the existing contracts for the
purchase of 230 Su-30MKI fighters and upcoming programs on the joint
development of T-50/PAK-FA project.
It was expected that Russia's failure at
the Indian tender would have a very negative impact on the prospects of
the MiG-35 in Russia. This year, though, the Defense Ministry of Russia
decided to purchase a trial batch of 24 fighters. What was it? Was it
an order to "preserve the unique personnel" or a "trial balloon" before
the decision to replace the remaining 200 MiG-29 in the Russian Air
Force with a better aircraft? Time will tell.
As for the current state of affairs in
Mikoyan Design Bureau, the failures that the company has been dealing
with during the recent years are related to the specific development of
Russia's military-industrial complex since Soviet times. MiG and Sukhoi
were working in parallel on projects of light and heavy fighters the
same way it was done in the United States.
The difference was about the fact that
the Americans, when passing aircraft from various commercial
manufacturers into service, required maximum unification on main
components. This is how a dual control aircraft was born from the F-15
by Boeing and the F-16 by Lockheed Martin - they had a one and the same
Pratt & Whitney F-100 engine. The U.S. Air Force not only managed to
save on the transition to the fourth generation of fighters, but also
simplified their future maintenance and upgrades.
In the USSR, the situation was somewhat
different. Major design bureaus in the Soviet military industrial
complex were more reminiscent of the property of feudal owners from the
High Middle Ages. Both MiG, and Sukhoi could use the developments of
only "their own" research institutes, rely only on "their own"
production base and were engaged in a competition for the exploitation
of resources of the planned economy.
The administration of the Soviet defense
industry that was still thinking with the categories of the Great
Patriotic War, was convinced that such a state of affairs was quite
acceptable. Parallel production chains were seen as a mobilization
reserve to dramatically increase military production in case of a
large-scale war. Any future unification between Su-27 and MiG-29 in such
circumstances was out of the question.
The Soviet Union could afford
maintaining two independent systems of fighter aircraft, but the Russian
Federation could not. Problems of the past put the two companies in
"the winter takes it all" situation. The winner will have to fit into
international arms markets.
Something like that was happening in the
West too. The end of the Cold War led to sharp reductions in military
spending; the new generation of military hardware was many times more
expensive than the previous one. The number of independent aircraft
manufacturers reduced sharply, whereas other manufacturers joined their
efforts to survive. An aircraft could exist if it could be exported.
Everybody had to learn to survive on their own, without relying on
government support.
Sukhoi entered the new period with the
T-10 platform that could be modernized and modified to meet customer's
needs. As a result "4 +" clones of Su-27 and Su-30 became in abundance
on international markets, while MiG was languishing without significant
international contracts for a whole decade.
In addition, the Su-27 was adopted after
the MiG-29 and was delivered to numerous allies and partners in much
smaller quantities. Sukhoi was playing on the field with no other
players nearby.